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Unidentified Bodies and Mass-Fatality Management in Haiti: 
A Case Study of the January 2010 Earthquake with a Cross-Cultural Comparison 
 
Abstract 
The following paper examines the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti as a case study to 
better understand what happens to unidentified bodies in mass-fatality management. The paper 
explores the literature on mass-fatality management, discusses the context of Haiti and the 
impact of the earthquake in this country, mentions the methods undertaken for this study, and 
then outlines the key lessons from this particular disaster. The paper compares preliminary 
findings in Haiti to other incidents in India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and concludes with a 
discussion of implications for research and practice. 
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Introduction 
Past disasters such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Indian Ocean tsunami, Hurricane 
Katrina, the Sichuan earthquake, and the Japan earthquake/tsunami/nuclear radiation release 
underscore the need for a thorough understanding of mass-fatality management (MFM). These 
aforementioned disasters resulted in a significant number of deaths to such an extent that the 
resources of local, state, and federal governments were severely overwhelmed. For instance, the 
Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004 and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in 
the United States killed over 275,950 and 2,792 people respectively (Koontz 2005; National 
Institute of Justice (NIJ) 2006). In these cases, the tsunami and terrorist attacks clearly strained 
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the response systems of the affected nations (Tun et al. 2005). One of the most significant 
potential problems after such major disasters is how to effectively deal with unidentified bodies. 
The goals of this research are two-fold. First, this study aims to broaden our 
understanding of the neglected function of MFM (Blanshan and Quarantelli n.d.; Tun et al. 2005) 
using the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti as a case study. Second, the paper will compare 
findings from Haiti to those from India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, with the aim of identifying 
lessons that could help improve our response to mass-fatality incidents in the future and advance 
our theoretical understanding of MFM.  
In an attempt to meet these goals, the paper explores the literature on MFM, discusses the 
context of Haiti and the impact of the earthquake in this country, mentions the methods 
undertaken for this study, and then outlines the key findings from this particular disaster. The 
paper compares findings in Haiti to other disasters in India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, and 
concludes with a discussion of implications for research and practice. 
Literature Review 
According to McEntire (2007, p. 159), a mass-fatality incident is a disaster “situation 
where there are more bodies than can be handled using existing local resources.” Jensen (2000, 
p. xi) similarly defines a mass-fatality incident as “any event that produces more fatalities than 
can be handled using local resources.” Teahen (2012, p. 1) asserts that “a mass fatalities incident 
is an event that causes loss of life and human suffering, which cannot be met through usual 
individual and community resources.” According to these definitions, the number of fatalities 
does not characterize a mass-fatality incident alone. If the number of fatalities is high but local 
resources are adequate to handle the deceased, then the incident will not be considered a mass-
fatality incident. Conversely, if the number of dead is low and a community does not have 
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adequate resources to manage the bodies, the incident may be regarded as a mass-fatality 
incident. Nevertheless, the number of fatalities is important because with a larger number of 
deaths, complexity increases (Scanlon and McMahon 2011) and more resources would be 
needed to manage the incident. Other significant factors in defining mass-fatality incidents 
include the condition of the dead and the way the deaths occurred (Jensen 2000). MFM 
complications also increase depending on the speed of the recovery of remains, the condition of 
bodies, and the lack of information describing who could be deceased (like manifest of a plane) 
(Scanlon and McMahon 2011; Tun et. al. 2005). A school bus accident that kills 10 students may 
have a lasting impact on responders and may engender a prolonged recovery time for the 
affected community (Jensen 2000; Teahen 2012). Even this small event, according to Jensen 
(2000), may qualify as a mass-fatality incident.  
The Need for Mass-fatality Management 
It is important to study mass-fatality management for at least two significant reasons. 
First, there are currently insufficient technical guidelines for dealing with large numbers of 
fatalities following large natural disasters (Morgan et al. 2006). Teahen (2012) does provide 
recommendations based on his personal experiences about how to cope with stress and manage 
the mass-fatality disaster site, the family assistance center, the staff processing center, and the 
victim identification center. Teahen (2012) asserts that “Mass Fatalities: Managing the 
Community Response is not a book about the dead” (p. xix). Instead, Teahen writes to assist the 
individuals who handle the remains.  In spite of this contribution, we simply do not know enough 
about the increasingly important MFM function in emergency management.  For instance, 
Morgan et al. (2006) note that guidelines exist for MFM in the purview of transportation 
accidents (e.g., Davis and Scraton 1999; Meyer 2003) and terrorist attacks (e.g., NIJ 2006). 
5 
 
However, these recommendations are not always transferable to mass-fatality incidents 
engendered by natural disasters.  
Second, through studies of major disasters and catastrophes, researchers can better 
understand MFM and provide policy advice to reduce psychological distress in the affected 
community or nation (Morgan et al. 2006).  Understanding mass fatality management may also 
facilitate compensation of death benefits (Phillips et al. 2008) and provide closure for surviving 
family members after disasters. 
Prior Work on the Subject 
Much of the pioneering research on MFM came out of the Disaster Research Center 
(formerly at Ohio State University, now at University of Delaware) almost four decades ago. 
These studies focused on mass-fatality incidents caused by flooding or dam failure (e.g., 
Blanshan 1977; Hershiser 1974; Hershiser and Quarantelli 1976; Quarantelli 1979), terrorist 
attacks (Aguirre and Quarantelli 2008), and the 2004 tsunami (Rodriquez et al. 2006). Other 
studies outside of the DRC have also emerged (e.g., Pine 1974; Jensen 2000; Klinenberg 2002; 
Shaler 2005; Umer et al. 2009; Teahen 2012). Some MFM studies also came out of Canada (e.g., 
Brannon and Kessler 1999; Scanlon 1998; 2006; 2008; 2009; 2011; Brenner 2006; Scanlon, 
McMahon, and van Haastert 2007; Stoney et al. 2011). In addition, other mass-fatality 
management studies have emerged from international organizations like World Health 
Organization (WHO) (e.g., Tun et al. 2005) and the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) 
(e.g., Morgan, Tidball-Binz, Van Alphen 2009). NIJ has also contributed to the advancement of 
this literature by producing documents on victim identification (NIJ 2005; 2006).  
Many of the previous MFM studies on natural disasters emerged after the Indian Ocean 
tsunami of December 26, 2004 (e.g., Perera 2005; Oyola-Yemaiel and Gupta 2005; Tun et. al. 
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2005; Oyola-Yemaiel and Gupta 2006; Brenner 2006; Gupta 2006; Morgan et al. 2006; 
Rodriquez et al. 2006; Roy 2006; Scanlon 2006; Scanlon et al. 2007; and Scanlon 2008). For 
instance, Morgan et al. (2006) examined the management of bodies following the Indian Ocean 
tsunami in three countries - Thailand, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. These authors found that the 
lack of local mass-fatality plans hindered the response to this incident (Morgan et al. 2006). 
Perera (2005) also studied the legal implications of mass burials of unidentified victims in Sri 
Lanka after the Indian Ocean tsunami and found that many of the unidentified victims were 
buried in mass graves. Therefore, he recommended that the Sri Lankan government develop a 
national emergency management plan addressing the problem of victim identification for future 
mass-fatality incidents (Perera 2005). 
However, with the notable exception of some important studies (e.g., Hershiser 1974; 
Blanshan 1977; Blanshan and Quarantelli (n.d.); Scanlon 1998; Scanlon 2006; Scanlon 2008; 
Scanlon 2009; Scanlon 2011; Scanlon et al. 2007; Stoney et al. 2011), there are still too few 
MFM studies on natural disasters. As a result, researchers have called for more field research on 
this subject (e.g., Morgan et al. 2006). Against the backdrop of a limited number of MFM studies 
on natural disasters, it becomes compelling to increase research endeavors in this area.  
The Process of Dealing with Bodies 
According to the literature, the response to a mass-fatality incident can be divided into 
two phases. The first phase involves rescuing victims and stabilizing the incident, while the 
second phase focuses on recovering bodies, identifying victims and collecting evidence (NIJ 
2005). Therefore, MFM typically begins once there is no further threat to life (Jensen 2000). 
However, the response to a mass-fatality incident consists of many actions that must be 
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performed in such a manner to ensure that the deceased are treated with dignity and in 
accordance to local customs and government laws (Jensen 2000; Teahen 2012).  
Many researchers have studied the process of handling bodies after mass-fatality 
incidents (e.g., Blanshan 1977; Blanshan and Quarantelli (n.d.); Oyola-Yemaiel and Gupta 
2006). For instance, Blanshan (1977) compared the body handling process during a normal death 
setting to that of the sudden-collective-death setting. She found that the body handling process 
for the former situation had six tasks while the latter events had eleven tasks (Blanshan 1977). 
Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami, Oyola-Yemaiel and Gupta (2006) 
examined and described the process of handling bodies in India and Sri Lanka. These authors 
studied the following stages of body handling: recovery, transportation, preservation, 
communication with the community, identification and the return of bodies to family members. 
This study will focus on the following body handling tasks, body recovery, followed by the 
storage of remains, identification, release of the deceased to family members and final 
disposition in accordance with prior research (Blanshan 1977; Blanshan and Quarantelli n.d.; 
Oyola-Yemaiel and Gupta 2006). 
Body Recovery. This is the first step that must be completed after any disaster (Morgan 
et al. 2006) and it is characterized by some degree of chaos and disorganization (Morgan et al. 
2009). For instance, individuals, the military, law-enforcement officers, volunteers, search and 
rescue teams, tourists, and firefighters (Morgan et al. 2006; Morgan et al. 2009) often undertake 
the body recovery process. Even tourists helped to recover bodies after the Indian Ocean 
tsunami. Body recovery also requires at times the use of heavy equipment– grapplers, bulldozers, 
and dump trucks – which may not be readily available in some nations due to the equipment’s 
high procurement and maintenance costs.  
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Body recovery may last a few days to several weeks, and in some cases, months, 
depending on the size of the disaster or manpower and resource availability (Morgan et al. 2009). 
Once bodies are recovered, they are often placed in body bags (Morgan et al. 2009). If body bags 
are not available, locally available materials (such as a shroud, plastic bags, bed sheets, etc.) may 
be used (Morgan et al. 2009). It is important that the collected personal effects are not be 
separated from the bodies where they were found since items like watches or wallets may help in 
identification or may be valuable to family members of the deceased (Morgan et al. 2009).  
Body Preservation. The next step after body recovery is storage. In order to preserve 
bodies for identification, they should be kept in cold storage (Morgan et al. 2009; Teahen 2012). 
The ideal location is in morgues, where temperature for storage is between 2
0
C-4
0
C (Morgan et 
al. 2009). However, due to the vast number of bodies that must be stored after some disasters, 
morgue spaces fill up quickly, leading to the use of less desirable alternatives. For instance, after 
the Indian Ocean tsunami, bodies were left in the courtyards of temples in Thailand (Scanlon 
2006). Similarly, in Sri Lanka, bodies were placed in emergency wards, hospital reception areas, 
and mosques (Oyola-Yemaiel and Gupta 2006; Scanlon et al. 2007). In some cases, there may be 
no refrigeration immediately after the disaster, so local authorities will need to improvise. As an 
example, local authorities in Thailand used dry ice while physicians in Sri Lanka coated bodies 
with formaldehyde in order to preserve bodies after the tsunami (Oyola-Yemaiel and Gupta 
2006; Scanlon et al. 2007). When morgues are full, refrigerated trucks or ice skating rinks can 
also be used to temporarily store bodies (Hooft, Noji, and Voorde 1989).  In some cases, those 
involved in MFM will need to rely on temporary burial (Morgan et al. 2006; Teahen 2012). 
Body Identification. After bodies have been recovered and stored, the next step is 
identification. The International Police Criminal Organization (Interpol) has developed disaster 
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victim identification guidelines, which state that all dead bodies must be properly identified 
(Scanlon 2006; Scanlon and McMahon 2011). From the medical/legal standpoint, body 
identification is the most important aspect of mass-fatality investigation (Perera 2005). The 
significance of identifying bodies has been summed up succinctly by an NIJ report that stated, 
“correct victim identification is essential to satisfy humanitarian considerations, meet civil and 
criminal investigative needs, and identify victim perpetrators” (NIJ 2005, p. v). In addition, 
PAHO and WHO have consistently called for victim identification so that families of victims can 
begin the recovery process (de Ville de Goyet 2004). Surviving families are more able to move 
on after the tragedy once they have confirmed that their loved ones are dead.  Proper 
identification is crucial to surviving families’ quest for closure.  
Body identification is a multidisciplinary process, involving the expertise of police, 
forensic experts, and medical examiners (Tun et al. 2005). Personal possessions recovered from 
victims, such as identification cards, can help reveal the identity of victims (Hooft et al. 1989). In 
addition, bodies may be identified by examining faces and body markings, like tattoos and scars. 
Although visual identification is simple, its use may be limited - especially in hot climates - 
where decomposition may reach advance stages within 12-48 hours after an incident (Morgan et 
al. 2009). As a result, visual identification may be difficult and unreliable. Perhaps due to this 
challenge, Morgan et al. (2009) have recommended that visual identification should be combined 
with other identification techniques.  
Bodies can also be identified through additional means including: fingerprint records, 
dental records, and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profiling (Shaler 2005; Brenner 2006; Scanlon 
2006; Teahen 2012). For example, Thailand carried out some identification using dental and 
fingerprint records after the Indian Ocean tsunami (Morgan et al. 2006). DNA may also be used 
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to identify bodies. This technique was instrumental in identifying the remains of the 9/11 victims 
and the remains of some of the terrorists that carried out the attacks (Shaler 2005). However, 
such methods are not always possible (McEntire 2009). This may be especially the case when 
there are limited DNA-profiling facilities and forensic experts to carry out the identification 
(Perera 2005). Unfortunately, Morgan et al. (2006) found that none of the three countries 
surveyed after the Indian Ocean tsunami (Thailand, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka) had sufficient 
forensic capability. This may be one reason why only 5,000 – 6,000 of the estimated 250,000 – 
300,000 people killed after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami have been formally identified 
(Scanlon 2006).  
As can be seen, the process of identification is by no means an easy task. In a bid to 
improve victim identification in future mass-fatality incidents, the Disaster Victim Identification 
System of the International Police Criminal Organization (Interpol 1997) was adopted by the 
international community as the international standard for victim identification (Scanlon 2006). 
However, even with existence of such systems, body identification may continue for up to a year, 
as was the case after the Indian Ocean tsunami (Scanlon et al. 2007) or up to three years after the 
9/11 terrorist attacks (Tun et al. 2005). 
Release of Deceased to Family Members. After a body has been positively identified, 
authorities will return the body to family members along with a death certificate (Morgan et al. 
2009; Perera 2005). Returning the bodies to relatives is vital since it gives them closure, allows 
them to grieve, and begin to recover from their loss. If bodies are not returned to relatives in a 
timely manner, it may exacerbate the sadness experienced by family members and magnify the 
psychological distress on the affected community. These sentiments were observed after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks and the Indian Ocean tsunami (Tun et al. 2005).  
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According to common practices, it is crucial to release bodies along with personal effects, 
no matter how insignificant they may seem (Jensen 2000; Teahen 2012). Personal effects can 
have considerable sentimental value to surviving family members (Jensen 2000; Teahen 2012). 
During this phase, information on the relative that claims a body, along with the body’s unique 
reference numbers, should be recorded (Morgan et al. 2009). All of this will be imperative if 
insurance or legal claims are to be justified.  
Disposition. After claiming bodies from authorities, relatives may decide to bury or 
cremate the bodies according to local customs and religious practices, which can vary widely. 
For example, most of the Western part of the world use coffins while Oriental cultures use 
shrouds (de Ville de Goyet 2004). Burial is preferred over cremation because it can maintain 
evidence for future forensic investigation, if necessary (Morgan et al. 2009; Teahen 2012). Burial 
sites must be carefully selected bearing in mind distance to the affected community, proximity to 
water sources, and soil conditions, among other factors (Morgan et al. 2009; Teahen 2012). 
However, in spite of these recommendations, cremation is becoming a more common practice 
around the world.  
Challenges Facing Mass-fatality Management 
According to researchers and practitioners, there are many challenges associated with 
mass-fatality incidents. This section discusses six challenges prevalent in major disasters. 
a. Lack of Resources. An often-overlooked challenge of mass-fatality incidents is the 
amount of resources needed to carry out such operations. Resources include personnel, 
equipment, and supplies (NIJ 2005). Shortage of these resources may hamper or alter the 
response to mass-fatality incidents. For example, inadequate storage facilities in morgues 
and the unavailability of refrigerated trucks resulted in mass burials in deep trenches in 
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Indonesia after the Indian Ocean tsunami (Morgan et al. 2006). When staff, equipment, 
and supplies are in short supply, the ability of a community to improvise and harness 
neighboring community resources is crucial in ensuring an effective response to a mass-
fatality incident. For example, Blanshan (1977) found that the use of volunteers was an 
effective strategy in helping to process the bodies of the dead after a flash flood in the 
Rocky Mountains of the western United States. Similarly, during the pandemic influenza 
(1918-1920), streetcars and grocery carts were used to transport dead bodies in Montreal 
(Scanlon and McMahon 2011).  
b. Decomposing Bodies and Health Risks. Researchers have consistently debunked the 
myth that remains will generate diseases among survivors in the hope of preventing the 
burial of disaster victims in mass graves (e.g., Hooft et al. 1989; de Ville de Goyet 2004; 
Kirkis 2006; Phillips et al. 2008; McEntire 2009; Morgan et al. 2009; Teahen 2012). 
Nevertheless, this MFM myth may have prompted local communities in Indonesia to 
embark on mass burials (Morgan et al. 2006). In fact, there were 14 mass graves close to 
Banda Aceh, Indonesia, the largest of which contained 60,000-70,000 victims (Morgan et 
al. 2006).  
c. Lack of Expertise or Training to Handle Bodies. Ordinary citizens may move the bodies 
of their loved ones (Morgan et al. 2009; Scanlon 1998; Scanlon and McMahon 2011) or 
bury or cremate the bodies without obtaining death certificates. The practice of moving 
bodies by those who are not experts is against the principles of identification contained in 
Interpol’s guide (Interpol 1997). Burying or cremating bodies without proper processing 
also makes it difficult for local authorities to ascertain an actual death toll.  According to 
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Scanlon and McMahon (2011), bodies should not be moved until marked and 
photographed where they are located.  
d. Lack of Pre-death Data. Without ante-mortem data, it will be difficult to identify the 
victims of any disaster using DNA, fingerprints, or dental records. This difficulty may be 
exacerbated when whole villages are wiped out by disasters as was the case in some 
Indonesian villages after the Indian Ocean tsunami. Another challenge inherent in mass-
fatality management is racial issues pertaining to the dead. Evidence from past disasters 
shows that the way bodies are treated sometimes depend on their race. For example, there 
was tremendous effort to identify the bodies of foreigners in Sri Lanka and Thailand after 
the Indian Ocean tsunami (Aguirre and Quarantelli 2008). In addition, Aguirre and 
Quarantelli (2008) examined why the official New York City list of the dead after 9/11 
did not contain Latino victims.   
e. Badly Disfigured Bodies and Bone Fragments. After a mass-fatality incident, bodies may 
be disfigured beyond recognition, and in some cases, only body parts and bone fragments 
may be found (McEntire 2009). This creates a nightmare situation for those in charge of 
identification. For example, 19,893 separate body parts were found after the 9/11 attacks 
at the World Trade Center (McEntire 2009).  
f. Unavailability of a List of the Deceased. A lack of a list of who may be deceased (like 
manifest of a plane) could pose a big challenge to those in charge of body identification 
(Tun et al. 2005; Scanlon and McMahon 2011). In the case of an airplane crash, it is 
relatively easy to use the manifest to identify those on board. However, after mass-
fatality incidents induced by disasters or an influenza pandemic, there may not be a list of 
the dead (Scanlon and McMahon 2011). Furthermore, the dead may be scattered over a 
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large area and sometimes whole villages may be wiped out, making it almost impossible 
to develop a list of the deceased.  
Unidentified Bodies 
As can be seen, forensic experts, medical examiners, and other relevant experts work 
diligently after a mass-fatality incident to identify those killed. In many cases, there are many 
unidentified bodies. Bodies may be unidentified for many reasons. First, body parts – such as 
fingers, teeth, legs, and the head – may be missing. Second, improper storage may lead to 
decomposition of the body, making identification difficult. Third, the identification technology 
needed may not be available in the affected nation. For instance, some poor countries do not 
have DNA technology for victim identification. Fourth, if the number is very high, it becomes 
more difficult to identify all the victims (Tun et al. 2005). Fifth, a lack of mass fatality 
management plans, especially regarding unidentified bodies, may prompt some communities to 
bury unidentified bodies in mass graves. In fact, Perera (2005) observed that unidentified bodies 
were buried along with identified bodies in Sri Lanka after the Indian Ocean tsunami. Rather 
than burying unidentified bodies in mass graves, Hooft et al. (1989) suggested that these bodies 
should be stored, embalmed or buried temporarily, so that their identities can be further 
investigated later. What to do with unidentified bodies is still an on-going research subject in 
need of further investigation. 
Context of the Haiti Earthquake 
To further the understanding of the difficulty of responding to mass fatality incidents, this 
paper examines the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Haiti is a country situated between the Caribbean 
Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean (Central Intelligence Agency 2011). Haiti shares the island of 
Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic along with a history of colonization, wars of 
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independence, and frequent political instability. Like many developing nations, Haiti is 
experiencing a young - but growing - population, increased urbanization, limited education, and 
a weak economy. Haiti also has one of the most disparate income structures in the world (Jadotte 
2006). While there are a privileged few, the majority of Haitians - 80% of the population - lives 
below the poverty line. This suggests that most Haitians survive on a budget of $2 per day or 
less, and 54% of the population fall below abject poverty (defined as less than $ 1 per day). 
Schuller (2008) therefore notes that Haiti is one of the poorest countries of the world, and it is 
also the least wealthy country in the Western hemisphere. Olson (2010) even termed Haiti as a 
“Fourth World” country that is desperately poor and unsustainable on its own. Due to such 
conditions, concerns about disasters and emergency management generally take a back seat. 
Hazards and Vulnerability in Haiti 
Haiti faces a variety of natural hazards including hurricanes and tropical storms. While 
these weather-related hazards pose constant threats in the summer and early fall, they do allow 
for warning and prediction. Seismic activity, which generally has no warning, occurs 
periodically in Haiti as the country is located at the intersection of the North American and 
Caribbean plates. For instance, on October 18, 1751, a major earthquake and resulting tsunami 
caused heavy destruction. A few weeks later, on November 21, 1751, another major earthquake 
destroyed Port-au-Prince, leaving one masonry building standing (Fierro and Perry 2010). On 
June 3, 1770, a sizeable earthquake struck Port-au-Prince again. There was another damaging 
earthquake on April 8, 1860, again accompanied by a tsunami (US Geological Survey (USGS) 
2011).  
In spite of these hurricanes, tropical storms and earthquakes in Haiti, homes and other 
structures are considered highly vulnerable. After the notable earthquakes in 1751 and 1770, 
16 
 
authorities required that buildings be constructed with wood and they forbade masonry (USGS 
2011). Unfortunately, that was 240 years ago, and human collective memory has faded over 
time. Today, there are no building codes in Haiti, and this is no surprise since engineering 
curriculum does not include seismic design in this country (Fierro and Perry 2010). Even if 
building codes existed, it is unlikely that they would be enforced or followed. In addition, 
architects, engineers, and contractors do not need licenses, and many people build their own 
homes with limited resources and knowledge (Fierro and Perry 2010). Consequently, buildings 
often lack sufficient rebar and do not contain the proper mix of sand and cement. While 73% of 
the buildings in Haiti were one-story with 82% having sheet metal roofs, 71% of multi-story 
houses and apartments had roofs made of concrete. In either case, the walls – which are made of 
concrete/block/stone (Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI) 2010a) – collapse 
easily under the strain of earthquakes.  
The 2010 Earthquake and its Impact on Haiti 
On Tuesday, January 12, 2010, at 16:53:10 hours, an earthquake of magnitude 7.0 on the 
Richter scale struck Haiti. The quake was located at 18.443°N, 72.571°W (about 25 km distance 
west/south west of the capital city of Port-au-Prince) with a depth of 13 km (Blanpied 2010). The 
earthquake occurred in the boundary region separating the Caribbean plate and the North 
America plate that is dominated by left-lateral strike slip motion and compression, with the 
Caribbean plate moving eastward against the North America plate. The earthquake did not 
produce observable surface displacement on the geomorphologically well-expressed main-strand 
of the Enriquillo-Plantain Garden fault system. Instead, the earthquake involved rupture of a 
fault or faults distinct from the previously mapped principal strand, causing significant uplift 
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along the Léogâne Delta (USGS 2011). Regardless of its unique nature, the earthquake lasted for 
35 seconds and was extremely violent. 
After the main earthquake, the USGS (2011) recorded at least 59 aftershocks of 
magnitude 4.5 or greater. Sixteen of these aftershocks had magnitudes of 5.0 or greater with the 
two largest having magnitudes of 6.0 and 5.9. The magnitude 6.0 aftershock occurred 7 minutes 
after the main shock on January 12 and the magnitude 5.9 event occurred on January 20. Due to 
the unrelenting aftershocks, people decided to live on the street or open areas for a lengthy 
period. 
In its Action Plan for National Recovery and Development document, the Government of 
the Republic of Haiti (2010) states that the number of houses totally destroyed and damaged due 
to the earthquake is estimated to be 105,000 and 208,000 respectively. In addition, another 1,300 
educational institutions and 50 hospitals and health centers collapsed and are unusable. The port 
was also considered inoperable after the earthquake. The earthquake even destroyed the 
Presidential Palace, Parliament, law courts, most ministerial buildings, and high-end tourist 
facilities like the Montana Hotel (Government of the Republic of Haiti 2011). Much of the 
damage was located in the city of Léogâne, the epicenter of the earthquake. Eighty percent of the 
collapsed or critically damaged buildings occurred in this jurisdiction (EERI 2010b).  
The Government of the Republic of Haiti (2010) estimates the damage
1
 and losses
2
 
resulting from the earthquake to be U.S. $7.9 billion, or about 120% of the country’s GDP in 
2009. Relative to the country’s economy, this is consequently one of the most expensive 
disasters in the world. About 70% of the economic losses from damaged assets occurred in the 
private sector while the public sector suffered about 30% of the losses. Considering the economy 
as a whole, the value of all types of physical assets destroyed is about 55%. The effect on 
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economic flows from loss of production, turnover, and employment is 45% (Government of the 
Republic of Haiti 2010). 
The human toll of the disaster was particularly significant.  While there are discrepancies 
in the statistics, the Government of Haiti estimated the number of dead to be more than 316,000 
(Gaestel and Brown 2011). The number of people injured in the earthquake is estimated to be 
300,000, and more than 4,000 of these individuals became amputees after life-saving operations. 
In addition, it is estimated that the earthquake directly affected about 1.5 million people (or 15% 
of the country’s population) (Government of the Republic of Haiti 2010).  Another 1.5 million 
people were indirectly affected (United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
2011) and the International Organization for Migration asserts that 680,000 individuals were 
displaced from their homes (USAID 2011). It has also been suggested that over 600,000 left the 
capital city and relocated to rural areas. However, as of March 2010, about 1.3 million people 
were living in temporary shelters in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Under such conditions, 
health officials became concerned about a major cholera outbreak in October 2010 (Ministère de 
la Santé Publique et de la Population and PAHO 2011).  It is estimated that there were ½ million 
registered cholera cases, of which 138,946 individuals required hospitalization (USAID 2011). 
More than 6,700 people died due to the cholera outbreak (Guyler-Delva, 2011).  
In order to have a baseline for comparing the response to the Haiti earthquake, it is 
imperative to discuss the normal death rituals in Haiti. The normal death rituals in Haiti follow 
the usual steps - body recovery, embalming, storage, positive identification, death certificate 
issuance, return of body to family members, and presentation (Blanshan 1977). However, during 
final burials, Haiti is unique. The Haitian culture – based on a combination of Roman 
Catholicism and Voodoo beliefs – believes in giving a befitting burial to the dead. This is why 
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burials in Haiti are often accompanied by huge fanfare and celebrations. The resources to carry 
out routine identification and disposition activities (e.g., morgue directors, forensic pathologists, 
funeral home directors, etc.) are available in normal circumstances.  However, these resources 
quickly become overstretched in mass-fatality incidents, such as the Haiti earthquake. 
Research Methods 
In order to improve the understanding of mass-fatality management, the authors of this 
study have undertaken a qualitative research design. Because the nature of this study as well as 
the situation in Haiti and other countries do not allow for quantitative or experimental methods, 
the focus has been on quick response research that is common in many disaster studies. Quick 
response research has been defined by Michaels (2003, p. 41) as the information collection phase 
occurring during or immediately after a damaging event. In accordance with this research 
practice, the authors therefore traveled to the field to collect perishable data, conduct interviews, 
and participate in direct observation. 
Timeline and Funding 
Two of the authors traveled to Haiti under a University of Colorado Natural Hazards 
Center (NHC) Quick Response Research Grant funded by the US National Science Foundation 
(NSF) (CMMI 0734304). They left on February 23, 2010 (as soon as commercial flights 
resumed) and remained in the country for 6 days. All three authors made the journey to Haiti on 
May 31, 2010 under this current NSF Rapid Response Research (RAPID) Grant (Award # 
1034799) to follow up on prior research efforts and remained there until June 3.  
In addition to the research in Haiti, one of the authors participated in an NSF Small Grant 
for Exploratory Research (#0522362) dealing with MFM after the Indian Ocean tsunami. He 
visited several locations from May to August 2005 in Kerala and Tamil Nadu states and the 
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Union Territory of Pondicherry in India as well as Ampara, Batticoloa, Colombo, Galle, 
Hambantota, and Matara in Sri Lanka. He sought to understand how the governments dealt with 
the death of 223,492 people, which includes 40,320 who are missing and presumed dead (Oyola-
Yemaiel and Gupta 2006, p. 413). This author also traveled to India and Bangladesh in the 
summer of 2009 under a NHC Quick Response Research Grant (CMMI 0734304) to understand 
MFM after Cyclone Aila (which killed 330 people on May 25, 2009). Finally, this same author 
visited India again under the current grant (Award # 1034799) to follow up research on Cyclone 
Aila and gather data regarding the Stephen Court building fire (which killed 41 people on March 
23, 2010) and the Gyaneswari Express derailment (which killed 147 people on May 28, 2010).  
Data Collection 
The primary method of data collection in this qualitative field study is interviews. While 
in the aforementioned countries, the authors conducted over 176 interviews about MFM, 
including 28 in Haiti. Interviewees were not selected randomly, but using a non-probability 
technique called snowball sampling (Ireland, Berg, and Mutchnick 2010). The snowball 
sampling method involved interviewing a few respondents identified by our contacts in Haiti and 
approved by the research team. After interviewing this first group of respondents, we asked the 
informants to name others that we could also interview and these individuals were sought out.  
Many of the interviews were face-to-face, while other knowledgeable individuals (who were not 
available or located in the affected countries) were contacted by phone. Most of the interviews 
were conducted in English, although some were conducted in other languages (e.g., in Haiti, we 
conducted some interviews in Haitian Creole). In these cases, interpreters were used to help 
collect the research data. 
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Those interviewed include government officials, U.N. representatives, morgue and 
funeral home directors, the Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT) leader, 
religious leaders, national and international non-profit employees, forensic pathologists, doctors, 
military and police officers, and fire fighters. Surviving family members, local residents, 
spontaneous volunteers, researchers, university administrators, and hospital superintendents also 
participated in this research. Respondents were asked a series of questions including the impact 
of the disasters in addition to the number and nature of fatalities. The authors also examined how 
bodies were recovered, transported, preserved, and identified (if that was possible). The 
participants also provided information about religious practices for the deceased as well as 
thoughts about burials in mass graves. Furthermore, we tried to find if there were differentiations 
in handling the cadavers based on the apparent socio-economic status or nationality. 
In addition to the interviews, the research team used secondary sources of information 
including media reports, government documents from the affected countries, or situation updates 
from the United Nations or non-governmental organizations. These were obtained through 
Internet searches or were provided from the contacts established during or after the interviews. 
The purpose of these additional sources was to corroborate initial findings or expand knowledge 
obtained from initial informants. Once the data from these interviews were collected and 
analyzed, the authors wrote up a case study of MFM in Haiti according to established research 
protocols (Yin 2009). MFM in Haiti was then contrasted with similar activities in the 
aforementioned disasters in India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka per the comparative method 
(Lijphart 1972). 
Mass-fatality Management in Haiti 
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 Mass-fatality management in Haiti reveals patterns similar to and different than other 
poor nations. Haiti was completely overwhelmed with the number of fatalities resulting from the 
earthquake and building collapses, and it was unable to identify the vast majority of bodies and 
avert their burial in mass graves. Because of the slow and ineffective response on the part of the 
government, some citizens dealt with the deceased in ways that may seem inappropriate to 
people in developed nations today. However, it is worth noting that in some past disasters, 
developed nations have engaged in questionable MFM practices too. For example, after the 
Chicago Heat Wave of July 1995, 68 unclaimed bodies were buried in mass graves outside of 
Chicago (Klinenberg 2002). 
 As previously mentioned, the fatalities in Haiti occurred in many structures, including 
government office buildings, schools, businesses, and homes. Depending on the type of the 
collapse and the conditions of safety or access, immediate family members, relatives, co-
workers, neighbors, or people who happened to be at the location of death attempted body 
removal. While the retrieval of bodies was immediately possible in some circumstances, it was 
unmanageable in many cases due to unstable rubble, limited entry and exit points, or the lack of 
proper tools and equipment. Thousands of bodies were removed within hours and days, while 
others were extracted weeks and months after the earthquake. It is believed that even more than 
one year after the incident, there were still locations where bodies have not been removed from 
collapsed structures. For instance, one man described his heart-wrenching experience of 
searching for his wife as follows: 
I was in my house . . . and was going to pick up my kids from school. At 
4:55 pm, the earthquake came, and my wife was inside the school [and] 
my son was in the same [building]. . . My son said he and his mother were 
on the first floor before the earthquake. His mother wanted to talk to the 
principal, whose office is on the second floor. My son went to the 
bathroom and the earthquake happened . . . He went outside . . . and [saw] 
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the school was totally collapsed. . . . After fifteen to twenty minutes, I saw 
my son coming alone without his mother. . . I took the car and went to the 
school. . . I saw people carrying bodies on the street. I saw people still 
trapped in the buildings crying. They were trying to move outside but 
could not. Everybody was screaming, crying, and there was complete 
disorder. . . I formed a team of five people and began to help move bodies. 
. . I never found the body of my wife. For two months nobody did 
anything. Every second and third day, I passed by the school to see if there 
was any change. . . But nobody helped. I went many times but I never saw 
my wife’s body. My wife died inside the school. . . I asked the school 
what they plan to do with the bodies inside the school. . . They said they 
cannot do anything. 
 If the bodies were extracted initially, they were most often laid (and sometimes piled) on 
sidewalks and streets in front of damaged buildings. One respondent described twenty-five 
bodies lying on the road in a space of just five meters. In other cases, bodies of the deceased 
were taken to functioning hospitals (including University General Hospital in Port-au-Prince) or 
the MINISHTA United Nations compound, where they quickly outstretched the capacities of 
people in those locations. Bodies were therefore moved to proper storage facilities.  However, 
the sheer number of deaths prevented efforts to retain bodies for any extended period of time, 
and in locations and at temperatures that would prevent tissue decomposition. 
In addition, it was reported that Haiti had very few mortuaries prior to the earthquake, 
and Port-au-Prince was not left with many functioning mortuary facilities after the earthquake. 
For this reason, people began to notice after a few days that the corpses were bloating and 
beginning to decompose. The warm, humid weather along with the delayed ability of the 
government, hospitals, and morgues to deal effectively with the large numbers of deceased, were 
causing bodies to deteriorate quickly. 
In some cases, bodies were identified by surviving family members or friends, who then 
sought proper storage and disposition by those providing funeral services. However, and as can 
be imagined, there was a significant shortfall in coffins and personnel to handle the deceased. 
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Some of the survivors who were interviewed told us that this delayed disposition resulted in 
extreme frustration and contributed to further emotional trauma after the earthquake. 
Nevertheless, the vast majority of bodies were not identified due to a variety of factors. For 
instance, some bodies did not possess any form of identification whatsoever, and this may have 
been common among a sizable group of impoverished Haitians. It was also reported that a few of 
those retrieving bodies accessed the wallets of victims and removed their contents (but did not 
return personal belongings to the original pockets). One interviewee described such a situation at 
the University of Port-au-Prince: 
There was a group of people from the streets looking for money, and while 
they were identifying the dead people, they just . . . put their hand in the 
pocket of the dead. . . [If] they find the money, they take the money and 
throw the [ID] card. . . Then somebody else takes it [the ID card] and 
brings it to us. In this way, we could identify some of the dead. 
 
Looting of bodies in Haiti can be described, according to Quarantelli’s (1994) classification, as 
minor.  It was covertly done by individuals under opportunistic conditions, but socially 
disapproved by Haitians.  
The loss of entire families or an inability to properly bury the dead in individually 
marked graves likewise made identification difficult or futile anyway. Furthermore, one United 
Nations official noted that there was no effective government command and control system in 
place for the first five days after the earthquake. He said there was a lack of professionals to 
follow the basic norms, as to “when you take a body, how you identify it, whether you take a 
photo or not, where you should keep immediate belongings, should they be kept in a vault or 
not?” The difficulty of accessing bodies also made identification problematic. One respondent 
replied that “it was definitely too late, you could not even see the faces of the body.” Therefore, 
identification was only pursued in select situations where relatives sought a traditional funeral 
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service. For most of the deceased, identification was either not attempted or was simply regarded 
to be an overwhelming task to accomplish. 
The dispersed location of the fatalities was also a problem in the disaster. When the 
earthquake occurred, people were involved in daily activities (such as work, school or shopping) 
that required them to be in locations far from their homes and relatives. Therefore, the deceased 
were located in many areas throughout the capital city and countryside. This fact, along with the 
lack of adequate proper identification or the loss of entire families in the disaster, made the 
return of bodies to relatives extremely difficult. A Deputy Commander of the Indian Central 
Industrial Security Force, working as part of U.N. police, also noted that very few family 
members came to retrieve bodies. In other cases, loved ones did attempt to retrace the steps of 
parents, siblings, and children in the hopes of finding them alive or receiving medical treatment 
elsewhere. They also searched local hospitals to retrieve bodies if they could be found. 
Unfortunately, this was painstakingly difficult because bodies were extracted from many 
locations and moved elsewhere. In addition, there was little effort on the part of hospitals to track 
down surviving family members because the number of deaths made this prohibitive. 
Where and when possible, bodies of the deceased were given last rites and either buried 
or cremated (according to the family’s wishes). In Haiti, this commonly occurred according to 
traditional Roman Catholic religious practices. However, there were also rituals performed by 
Voodoo priests. These rituals were important to certain individuals since “in the Voodoo belief . . 
. the souls of people buried without the correct rituals remain close at hand and put a hex on the 
area” (Ghosh 2010). One such Voodoo priest noted that 4,000 to 5,000 bodies were taken to a 
cemetery in Dajao. He said: 
The ceremony of last rites was performed in the streets and not in the 
church. . .The Voodoo ceremony tries to free the spirits from the dead 
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bodies. . .The ceremony was performed by myself with other people. . .We 
started on January 15 . . . and continued. More bodies were found, they 
were brought and prayers continued. The last day of the ceremony was 
January 30
th
. All the witch doctors came to gather [and] prayed for the 
people who had passed away. 
 
When asked about the particulars of the ceremony, he mentioned that he meets the family 
at the cemetery, calls for the spirit to protect the body, and burns incense so that the body could 
smell the incense and other people could not take away the spirit.  
Although there were efforts to be sensitive to last rites, as required of specific religions, 
the reality of the situation made this improbable. One United Nations official commented on the 
difficulty of this goal: 
Every nationality has its own . . . customs and traditions to be followed to 
keep a dead body. The U.N. lost its own personnel, which included 
Muslims, Christians and Hindus. So there were issues about keeping the 
bodies together, keeping the bodies in separate places, keeping the bodies 
in refrigerators, or in other conditions. But at the end of the day, when it is 
a crisis, I don’t think . . . these things matter . . . We all say to ourselves, 
“we have a task at hand. We have to get these bodies preserved before 
they get destroyed.” Therefore, we cannot really pay heed to all the 
customs and traditions. 
 
The disposition of bodies through normal death practices was also rare in Haiti. Because 
piled bodies were decomposing rapidly, and since the efforts to retrieve, store, identify, and 
dispose of bodies was seemingly slow or non-existent, some Haitians doused bodies with 
gasoline and lit them on fire. Haitians described a pungent odor that had to be ridded of and felt 
this was the only way to resolve the situation. Nevertheless, for the vast majority of the bodies, 
on-site cremation did not occur. 
Reeling from the event itself, the government gradually began to mobilize its resources to 
deal with the mass-fatalities. On January 13, 2010, the government appointed the Central 
National Equipment (CNE), the government public works department, as the agency to lead 
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mass-fatality efforts. The CNE and many other international governmental or non-government 
agencies collected bodies with human labor and dump trucks, but then had the difficult decision 
of determining what to do with the remains. The Haiti government decided that mass burials 
would be required and many of the bodies were taken to vacant fields just outside of Titanyen 
(about an hour North East of Port-au-Prince). A number of long trenches were dug with a 
backhoe and bulldozer, and thousands of bodies were laid to rest in mass graves. 
When asked about what was taking place, a heavy equipment operator replied that “it had 
to be done” (as cited by Ghosh 2010). However, not all victims were treated similarly. According 
to one reporter, “some dump trucks seem to have simply unloaded their cargo of corpses and 
rubble into the open [elsewhere]. Some halfhearted attempts at burial have been left incomplete. 
The result is a scene from a bad horror film: mounds of red earth, with body parts sticking out at 
grotesque angles. Some bodies are totally exposed, putrefying into a shade of yellow” (Ghosh 
2010). Some survivors consequently felt “numb” because they did not know where their loved 
ones were buried and they believed the treatment of bodies was insensitive.  
Although the management of mass-fatalities after the earthquake may be deemed 
inappropriate in many nations, several of the respondents noted that Haiti did the best it could 
with the situation it was facing. The country operates under difficult circumstances normally, and 
the disaster killed many civil servants and destroyed many government buildings including the 
Presidential Palace (the President had to seek shelter in a police station according to one 
interviewee). For the most part, those interviewed were sympathetic to what Haiti was dealing 
with before and after the earthquake. 
A Notable Exception 
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As noted above, mass-fatality management in Haiti was, for the most part, improvised 
and conducted according to norms of necessity versus principles of preference. However, 
foreigners who died in Haiti were treated differently. For instance, governments around the 
world sent individuals and teams to Haiti to obtain the corpses of their citizens and return them 
to family members in their respective countries. The U.N. also provided body bags and wooden 
caskets for those who died in their office buildings. The U.N. compound had refrigerated 
containers, but these were inundated as people and police brought bodies by vehicles, vans, and 
trucks.  
The U.N. also contracted with Kenyon International Emergency Services, a company that 
specializes in MFM. Kenyon arrived in Haiti on January 14, 2010 and helped the U.N. and other 
clients recover, identify, and return the personal effects and bodies of the deceased. Kenyon 
International was instrumental in the successful recovery of deceased U.N. workers killed in 
Hotel Montana. Kenyon International continued its MFM responsibilities until July 2010.  
The United States government also became involved in the retrieval of Americans who 
perished in the earthquake. Two days after the earthquake, a team of representatives from the 
Department of Health and Human Services (operating under ESF 8) arrived in Haiti. A sizable 
portion of the crew immediately went to work (as best they could under the circumstances) to 
help with rescue operations and treat Haitians in portable hospitals, clinics and functioning 
hospitals. Four individuals affiliated with DMORT started to assess mass-fatality concerns, but 
they arrived with no formal mission or official U.S. role for this responsibility. 
During the initial period of operations, many individuals and organizations asked the 
assessment team what should be done with deceased Americans. The team began communicating 
these inquiries to the U.S. embassy in order to convey needs and resolve legal and financial 
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concerns about Department of Health and Human Services DMORTS working in a foreign 
country. For days, there were no definitive answers and the situation was extremely dynamic. 
About this time, a Congressional Representative arrived in Haiti and started to pressure the U.S. 
government to act. He traveled at the request of American families who lost students while on a 
study abroad from Lynn University. The attention he brought to the issue was enough for 
decision makers to activate DMORT nearly one full month after the Haiti earthquake. 
The goal of the team was to facilitate body collection and repatriation to America. In 
many cases, notes and calls from Haitian citizens and hospitals relayed information about dead 
Americans and where remains could be picked up. However, Americans also remained trapped 
under rubble, as was the situation at the Hotel Montana. Soldiers from the 113
th
 Mortuary Affairs 
out of Fort Lee, VA conducted search and recovery operations at this location. They had the 
proper training and equipment to extract corpses from collapsed buildings. Regardless of where 
the bodies were initially found, they were taken to DMORT, which was set up at the Port-au-
Prince airport. 
The portable morgue unit at the airport had refrigerated trucks and containers, powered 
by fuel from the U.S. military, which were used to store bodies. The forensic professionals were 
divided into teams and worked on a 24 hour schedule (with 12 hour shifts) to process the 
remains. The DMORT process included an X-ray of the remains in the body bag, an admitting 
and numbering of the corpse, a catalog of personal effects, the taking of photos and finger 
printing, pathology and anthropological exams, dental observation, and collection of DNA 
specimens. 
While this information was being acquired, an ante-mortem team in Florida collected 
similar information from family members who claimed to have lost relatives in Haiti. This 
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included data about body height and weight, hair color, tattoos, jewelry, DNA, and medical or 
dental records. When a positive match could be made (and there was absolute certainty that the 
remains were those of an American citizen), the remains and a tracking manifest were flown by 
the Air Force to a base in Dover, Delaware (the designated location to receive and process all of 
the remains of soldiers and diplomats who die abroad). At this point, the bodies were returned to 
families or sent to local funeral homes for proper ceremonies and burials. 
By the time they finished operations in Haiti at the end of March, DMORT had processed 
over 200 American bodies. When asked about lessons learned from the experience, a DMORT 
official commented that the U.S. government needs to determine operating procedures in foreign 
nations when there is no coroner or legal jurisdiction. He also acknowledged the difficulty of 
language barriers and recommended adequate “fly away kits” including cell phones, lap tops, 
printers, and other working tools.  
Cross-Cultural Comparison 
 Haiti’s experience with mass-fatalities was both similar to and different than other major 
emergencies and disasters in India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. First, a number of individuals and 
organizations retrieved bodies after the Indian Ocean tsunami in India and Sri Lanka, after 
cyclone Aila in Bangladesh and India, and after the Stephen Court building fire and the 
Gyaneswari train derailment in India. In addition, local citizens, police and fire departments, the 
military, and the Indian National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) attempted to retrieve bodies 
drowned or buried in a mudslide after Cyclone Aila. A Deputy General Commandant of NDRF 
commented that “the recovery of bodies was a team effort [among] government and local people. 
Local people informed [the police] about the bodies . . . Police collected the bodies and brought 
[them] to the hospital morgue for postmortem.” These findings about body retrieval are 
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consistent with the experience in Haiti and prior studies about human behavior in disaster 
situations, although postmortem activities were almost non-existent after the Haiti earthquake. 
 Second, after the aforementioned emergencies and disasters, divergent patterns emerged 
regarding body storage. For instance, many of the corpses after the tsunami in India were 
preserved for up to two weeks while this was less common in Sri Lanka. In Bangladesh, after 
Cyclone Aila, remains were stored for a short period (generally 4-5 days). When the fire and 
train derailment occurred in India, the remains of the deceased were taken to hospitals and 
morgues, and were kept for at least fifteen days and even for months while identification and the 
notification process occurred. This finding lies in stark contrast to what happened in Haiti. After 
the earthquake, bodies were taken to hospitals or morgues, or were simply piled in the streets. 
However, the government of this Caribbean nation made little or no effort to store bodies for 
extended periods of time (which was understandable since the number of deaths was of a far 
greater magnitude than the much smaller incidents in India). 
 Third, the process of identification witnessed a broad range of options after the various 
mass-fatality incidents. After the Indian Ocean tsunami, some of the individuals were identified 
in India but this was less common in Sri Lanka. In Cyclone Aila, all of the deceased could be 
identified and most of the deceased could be clearly recognized after the fire and derailment in 
India too. For instance, some of the bodies were identified through photo debit cards, 
photographs taken of the deceased at the incident location with their publication at police stations 
or through the media, recognition of the deceased by surviving neighbors and relatives, or a 
measurement of skulls as compared to existing pictures. A professor of forensics who was 
involved in MFM after the Stephen Court building fire commented that in “thirty-six cases . . . 
remains [were clearly identified] from their belongings, from their clothing, from their 
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anatomical structure, from their facial configuration. . . . In seven of the forty-one cases, the 
identification process was done through DNA [collection].” When identification occurred in 
India after these smaller incidents, the bodies were released through official processes to 
relatives. In contrast, there were fewer methods used to accurately determine identification in 
Haiti, although sophisticated technical procedures were used for deceased foreigners. Again, this 
difference was most likely a function of the extent of the disaster in Haiti. 
 Fourth, the release and disposition of the deceased was divergent in the countries 
examined for this study. After the Indian Ocean tsunami, the identified dead were released to 
family members in India but unidentified cadavers were buried in mass graves near the coast 
(and this was the case in Sri Lanka as well). In Bangladesh, government officials had less 
oversight of MFM, and family members or neighbors maintained bodies and often buried them 
in individual graves in their yards or at mosques or public cemeteries. In the case of the fire and 
train accident, officials in India were hesitant to dispose of remains in a hasty manner. Although 
a Deputy Secretary of a Disaster Management Department in India stated, “there was no policy 
for dealing with unidentified bodies,” in most cases bodies were stored for two weeks to a month 
to allow for positive identification. In addition, a legal approval process appeared to be required 
for the disposal of unidentified bodies in various jurisdictions: 
 “So the procedure of disposal is as per government order.” 
 “Until and unless my superior . . . gives it in writing to dispose of [the body] . 
. . it will be where it is.” 
 “If the identity [is not determined] . . . the unidentified bodies are cremated in 
consultation with the health department.” 
 “If the body is not identified or if the claimant does not come in 15 days, then 
the body is disposed of by the hospital under the orders of the executive 
magistrate. The hospital [performs] . . . the cremation.” 
 
The situation in Haiti was substantially different. Mass burial for unidentified remains was 
approved on a national, as opposed to individual scale. 
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 Fifth, if bodies were identified, last rites were at the discretion of surviving friends and 
family members. This was common in India and Sri Lanka after the Indian Ocean tsunami as 
well as in Bangladesh after Cyclone Aila. There was also no effort on the part of the government 
to perform last rites for the deceased in India after the fire and train accident occurred. While 
respondents were aware of and attempted to respect different religious traditions, they felt that 
the “. . . government should never bother” with these matters. Instead, those interviewed said 
“we are [concerned] . . . about the . . . public interest, public health, sanitation, etc. . . We are 
technical people . . . so we do not encourage rituals. Our government is a secular government.” 
Religious ceremonies for the deceased were therefore left to the preference of the family 
members. Where possible, this was also the case in Haiti (e.g, Roman Catholic or Voodoo 
ceremonies). However, because of the large numbers of bodies buried in mass graves, most of 
the deceased – to our knowledge – had no form of rituals whatsoever. 
 Finally, MFM was a sensitive subject in each of the countries examined for this study. In 
India and Sri Lanka, MFM was a delicate topic due to the overwhelming number of deaths that 
occurred after the Indian Ocean tsunami. While Bangladesh did not suffer to the same extent 
after Cyclone Aila, family members were devastated by the loss of their loved ones. Such 
feelings were apparent in India after the Stephen Court building fire because it was believed that 
the response by the fire department was slow and insufficient. In addition, some of the bodies 
were not identified for several weeks after the Stephen Court building fire so one respondent 
noted “the administration acted in a very careless way. Human dignity was played with. 
Individual’s rights were not safeguarded. The value of personal life was discounted.” This 
viewpoint was shared by surviving friends and relatives in Haiti. Also, government officials in 
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Haiti refused to be interviewed or declined to answer questions about how they dealt with mass-
fatalities after the January 2010 earthquake. 
Discussion, Implications and Conclusion 
 This exploration into the literature on mass-fatalities, as well as the actual management of 
this function in Haiti and in other countries, has several implications for research and practice. 
On the academic side, there is clearly a need for further studies of mass-fatality disasters. The 
findings in this paper reveal that it is imperative that we more fully understand how to deal with 
thousands of bodies in general and unidentified remains in particular. For instance, are there 
effective and simple ways to track corpses from recovery and storage to disposition? Also, 
research methods for obtaining data on how governments respond to mass-fatality incidents 
should be explored, especially since there is great reluctance on the part of informants to share 
their perspective on this sensitive subject. A final recommendation for scholarship is to advance 
research into MFM in developing nations and with a comparative perspective. Such measures 
would advance theoretical understanding as well as aid in the education and training of 
professionals. 
 In terms of practice, this research on the experience of MFM in Haiti and India highlights 
several questions and recommendations that could be addressed in future disasters. First, are 
there ways to help developing nations quickly and safely extract human remains from collapsed 
buildings after the needs of survivors have been met? Would a request for international donations 
for this purpose help provide resources to accomplish this task in a shortened time frame? 
Second, how can hundreds or thousands of bodies be stored when corpses quickly outstrip 
resources of hospitals, morgues, and funeral homes? Can international advisory or support teams 
be sent to developing nations when major mass-fatality disasters occur? Third, what methods 
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could be employed to identify bodies when disposition is urgently needed? Could the use of 
digital cameras serve as a simple way to provide photographic evidence for those seeking 
information about the deceased in mass-fatality incidents? Fourth, how can record keeping be 
improved for unidentified bodies? Are there tracking methods or computer programs that could 
be utilized for this function of emergency management? Finally, what barriers have to be 
overcome so foreign governments can quickly extract and return remains to their countries of 
origin? What international agreements and domestic policies need to be put in place so 
organizations like DMORT can operate more efficiently after disasters abroad? 
 As has been illustrated, the Haiti earthquake was a worst case scenario for the Haiti 
government and the international community. The complexity of this mass-fatality incident can 
be described using Tun et al.’s (2005) characterization – overwhelming number of dead, the 
absence of a list of the dead, many badly disfigured bodies, and quick recovery of thousands of 
bodies within a short time. These factors created an insurmountable challenge for those in charge 
of body handling so that the Haiti government had to issue directives for mass burials. An 
important issue worth noting is that of determining priorities among the living and the dead. 
Survivors were in need of urgent medical care, food, water, and shelter. The Haitian government 
and the international community focused their attention first on those alive using limited 
available resources.  This was the right thing to do according to many experts (e.g., Hershiser 
1974; Jensen 2000; NIJ 2005; Tun et al. 2005).    
 To conclude, recent disaster trends suggest that MFM is becoming a more important 
emergency management function compared to the past. Events like the Haiti earthquake and 
other incidents elsewhere reveal that more research is urgently needed on mass-fatality disasters. 
In addition, there is a significant need to improve MFM and the response efforts of developing 
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nations and the international community concerning unidentified bodies. We hope this paper will 
provide some direction as scholars and practitioners attempt to increase our knowledge base and 
improve our ability to deal with mass-fatality disasters. 
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1
 Damages are estimated at the replacement value of physical assets completely or partially destroyed, built using 
the same standards that prevailed before the disaster. 
2
 Losses are estimates from the economic flow resulting from the temporary absence of the damaged assets.  
